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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
STEVEN M. ESERNIA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
OVERLAND MOVING COMPANY, 
a corporation, and THOMAS C. 
JONES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLAN·T'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Case No. 
7195 
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are appellant's) 
On June 24, 1943, Steven M. Esernia, age 26 (Tr. 
79) and Paul Meredith were in the town of Elko, Nevada. 
At the· time both men were in the United States Marine 
Corps. At about ten o'clock in the evening (Tr. 80), a 
truck of the defendant Overland Moving Company, 
loaded with furniture and household goods (Tr. 152) 
and being driven by the defendant Thomas C. Jones, 
pulled alongside a small hamburger stand in the eastern 
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outskirts of Elko, where the plaintiff and Meredith were 
standing. The driver asked them if they were going to 
Salt Lake and if they wanted a ride (Tr. 81). The 
offer was accepted, and the two men entered the moving 
van as guests (admitted by answer Tr. 25). Esernia 
was sitting on the right side of the van cab and Meredith 
in the middle between the driver and Esernia (Tr. 82). 
The driver was alone at the time the trip from Elko 
commenced and prior to the time Esernia and Meredith 
entered the cab (Tr. 82). 
At the time Esernia entered the van, the driver 
stated that he was tired and weary and wanted someone 
to talk to and also wanted company (Tr. 122). Esernia 
later testified (Tr. 122) that the driver stated he wanted 
company so he wouldn't fall asleep, although the evi-
dence is not entirely clear as to whether the driver made 
this statement at the time of or pTior to Esernia 's enter-
ing the van or shortly after the journey had started. 
About an hour out of Elko, the driver stated that he 
did not mind either Esernia or Meredith dozing, but 
that he wanted one of them to keep busy so he would 
stay awake (Tr. 82). About an hour after the trip 
started, or possibly four hours (Tr. 124), Esernia dozed· 
a little and woke up to find the truck bouncing along 
the shoulder of the road, the country adjacent to the 
road being wilderness and flat (Tr. 84). It was, of 
course, dark at that time. The driver pulled the truck 
back onto the highway and stated that he had dozed 
off (Tr. 86). The driver mentioned a few times that 
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he '\Yas sleepy and stated that he did not want both of 
the guests to sleep as it '\Yould make him sleepy (Tr. 
123, 124). During the entire trip, neither Esernia nor 
Meredith got out of the cab, and Esernia did not recall 
that the driver stopped, other than at a stop sign (Tr. 
125, 126). 
The driver stated that he had stopped at Wendover 
and Delle, Utah, on the trip, and that at the latter place 
both guests were asleep at the time of the stop ( Tr. 156). 
At about six o'clock in the morning of June 25, the 
truck was travelling toward the scene of the accident 
near the junction of U. S. highway 40 and 50, which 
is approximately one mile in an easterly direction from 
the Lake Point Service Station and somewhat over a 
mile west of Black Rock Beach in Utah (Tr. 59). The 
road at the scene of the accident ran in a northerly 
direction, curving slightly to the east (Tr. 61). (See 
also Exhibit "A" prepared by State Highway Pa-
trolman Frank Eastman, Tr. 60.) At the northerly 
side of the curve were a series of six guard rails, the 
center of which were five feet six inches ( Tr. 64) from 
the northerly edge of the paved portion of the highway, 
and to the north of these guard rails was a culvert some 
thirteen feet northerly from said edge (Tr. 64). The 
truck failed to make the curve and crossed from the 
southerly side of the highway across and onto the gravel 
on the northerly side of the highway, and passed betwee~ 
the culvert and the guard rails ( Tr. 65) some distance 
to the north and east .where the truck ultimately tipped 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
over on its side. Two of the guard rails, 6" x 6", were 
damaged by the truck's passage (Tr. 70). The distance 
from the point where the truck left the north edge of 
the hard surface of the highway to the culvert was 264 
feet (Tr. 65), and from that point to the point where 
the truck came to rest was approximately 386 feet. 
There is some conflict in the testimony relative to this 
latter distance (Tr. 72). The road at the scene of the 
accident was more or less level (Tr. 74) with a slight 
upgrade (Tr. 75) and of standard two-lane width. 
As a result of the departure of the truck from the 
road and the fact that it tipped over on its side, the 
plaintiff Esernia received very substantial and perma-
nent injuries, necessitating extensive periods of hospi-
talization (Tr. 91 to 118). 
The first thing of the accident that the driver re-
called was the front wheel of the truck hitting the gravel 
on the side of the road ( Tr. 156), passing between the 
guard rails and the culvert, striking the last two guard 
rails, and tipping over on its side. The reason the truck 
left the highway was, as the driver stated, ''I must 
have dozed, or something'' ( Tr. 188; see also Exhibit 
'' B ''), and he assumed that the accident was caused 
by his going to sleep ( Tr. 189). The driver did not 
agree with Patrolman Eastman as to the distance the 
truck traveled on the gravel from the hard surfaced 
portion of the highway to the guard rail, his estimate 
being about 40 or 60 feet (Tr. 190). Dilworth S. Wooley, 
vice-president and general manager of the company, 
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stated that drivers "\Yere instructed not to take riders in 
the truck ( Tr. 200). 
At the conclusion of the testimony of plaintiff, a 
motion to dismiss as to both defendants "Tas denied by 
the court (Tr. 148). Thereafter, and at the conclusion 
of the testimony of both plaintiff and defendant, the 
court granted a directed verdict in favor of both the 
defendant Thomas C. Jones and the defendant Over-
land :Jfoving Company (Tr. 202, 203). 
STATEMENT OF ERROR 
Appellant and plaintiff relies upon the following 
errors: 
Error Number 1 
The trial court erred in granting the motion of 
defendant Thomas C. Jones for a directed verdict (Tr. 
37, 202). 
Error Number 2 
The trial court erred in granting the motion of 
defendant Overland Moving Company for a directed 
verdict (Tr. 37, 203). 
ARGUMENT 
Since the motion for a directed verdict as to each 
defendant involves substantially the same considera-
tions, for purpos·es of this brief they will be treated 
together. An adequate consideration of the action of 
the trial court in granting the motions resolves itself 
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into several categories. The motions were made not 
only upon the ground that there was a failure of the 
plain tiff to prove the willful misconduct of the defend-
ants, but also that the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence and that he assumed the risk. As to 
the defendant Overland Moving Company, there is also 
the additional ground alleged in its motion that the 
driver and employee had no authority to carry guest 
pass·engers in the van. Since the court did not indicate 
the ground upon which the motions were granted, other 
than as reflected in the motions themselves, it becomes 
necessary to consider the several grounds of the motions. 
A. Action on the part of the defendants amounting 
to willful miscondu·ct. 
It is believed that there can he no dispute that there 
was adequate evidence from which the jury could have 
found that the driver of the van dozed and went to 
sleep at the wheel, with the result that the van continued 
on across a curve in the highway to the opposite side 
of the road and turned over, injuring plaintiff. Actually, 
the evidence on this point is so clear and convincing, 
that no other conclusion could possibly have been 
reached. It also seems equally clear that the driver 
had a premonition of his physical condition and a knowl-
·edge that he was sleepy and tired. It will be noted that 
at th'e time plaintiff and his traveling companion were 
picked up in Elko, Nevada, there is some testi1nony 
that the driver initially stated he was sleepy and wanted 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
company on the trip to keep awake, although there 
is also testimony indicating that at this particular time 
he merely stated that he was tired and wanted company. 
The testimony is not entirely clear on this matter, there 
being positive statements as to both versions in the 
testimony of plaintiff. At any rate, some time after 
departing from Elko and while en route to Salt Lake 
City, the truck left the har·d surface portion of the 
highway and traveled for some distance on the shoulder 
when the driver momentarily dozed, although nothing 
happened as a result of his action and the van was 
ultimately pulled back upon the highway. Also there 
is an abundance of testimony that at numerous times 
during the trip, the driver stated that he was tired and 
sleepy, and that he was aware of his physical condition 
which was one dangerous to the adequate driving and 
control of the van. We believe that the evidence relative 
to the cause of th'e accident and premonition of physical 
condition is so clear that additional reference to the 
transcript beyond that set forth in the statement of 
facts is unnecessary. 
By virtue ·of the requirements of the Utah "guest" 
statute, 57-11-7 U.C.A. 1943, an action by a guest against 
the driver of a vehicle must be grounded either upon 
intoxication or willful misconduct. Since there is no 
elem'ent of intoxication in this case, the complaint was 
predicated upon the actions noted above as being willful 
misconduct. we believe that the applicable law clearly 
establishP,s that a driver who goes to sleep at the wheel 
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of a moving vehicle with the result that it leaves the 
highway .and turns over, with premonition of his :sleepy 
condition" is guilty of ''willful misconduct'' under a 
guest statute such as was in effect in Utah at the time 
of the arciden t here involved. 
The physical attributes of a sleepy condition and 
their eff~ct on driving ability have been frequently 
considered in cases of this kind. One of the most quoted 
decisions is that of Bushnell vs. Bushnell, 131 Atl. 432 
(Conn. 1925), and the language of that decision is par-
ticularly applicable here, even though the problem of 
negligence was not .that of willful misconduct. At page 
435, the court stated: 
''Sleep in such a situation does not ordinarily 
come upon one unawares, and, by watching for 
indications of its approach or heeding circum-
stances which are likely to bring it about, one 
may either ward it off or ceas~ an activity 
capable of danger to himself or to others. There 
are few ordinary agencies so fraught with danger 
to life and property as an automobile proceeding 
upon the highway freed of the direction of a 
conscious mind, and, because this .is so, reasonable 
care to avoid such a danger requires a very 
. great care.'' 
In Steele v-s. Lackey, 177 Atl. 309 (Vt. 1935) defend-
ant was driving plaintiff home from a dance when, 
without previous indication of sleepy condition, he dozed 
at the wheel while rounding a slight curve. The car left 
the highway and in the resulting accident plaintiff was 
injured. Th'e action was brought under a Vermont guest 
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statute requiring gross neg~ligence, "chich the court 
viewed as a degree of fault between ordinary negligence 
and reckless or wanton misconduct. Judgment for plain-
tiff "\Yas affirmed. The court stated at page 312: 
''It is said that sleep does not ordinarily ar-
rive "\Yithout "\Yarning or premonitory symptoms. 
Bushnell Y. Bushnell, supra, page 435 of 131 A; 
Go,ver v. Strain, supra; Devlin v. Morse, supra. 
Normally it did not come unheralded to the de-
fendant, as he admitted. There was sufficient 
evidence to enable the jury, acting reasonably, to 
find that he knevv, or ought to have known, that 
it vvas likely that sleep would come, and that, in 
these circumstances, his operation of the car was 
conduct indicating an indifference to the duty 
O"\Yed to the plaintiff as his guest, or an utter 
forgetfulness of her safety.'' 
In Marks vs. Marks, 31 N. E. 2d 399 (Ill. 1941), 
plaintiff guest and defendant driver were proceeding 
from D·etroit to Chicago. They left Detroit about 5 or 
5:30 p. m. and about 9 :30 p. m. plaintiff suggested they 
stop for night but defendant was anxious to continue on 
into Chicago for business reasons, 'vhich they did. Plain-
tiff himself participated in driving a portion of the 
way, and actually was driving the car when they entered 
Chicago at 5 :00 a. m. wh·ere they ran out of gas. While 
obtaining gasoline, one of the men stated he was tired 
and sleepy, and they were admonished by the attendant 
at the gas station that they had better watch their step. 
Shortly after leaving the gas station defendant fell 
asleep, and plaintiff himself was also asleep, when the 
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accident occurred. Judgment for the plaintiff was af-
firmed. 
The Illinois statute required and the complaint 
charged the defendant, second count, with wanton, will-
ful, and malicious misconduct. This the defendant de-
nied, hut he also stated that if such conduct constituted 
such willful and wanton misconduct, the plaintiff was 
equally guilty of the same misconduct. 
The case contains a review of many Illinois deci-
sions, and also emphasizes that ill will is not an element 
of wilful misconduct. Thus at page 401: 
''In Bernier v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 296 
Ill. 464, 129 N. E. 747, 749, the court said: 'Ill 
will is not a necessary element of a wanton act. 
To constitute a wanton act, the party doing the 
act or failing to act must he conscious of his con-
duct, and, though having no intent to injure, 
must he conscious, from his knowledge of sur-
rounding circumstances and existing conditions, 
that his conduct will naturally or probably result 
in injury. * * * It is difficult, if not impossible, 
to lay down a rule of general application by 
which we may determine what degree of negli-
. gence the law considers equivalent to a \villful or 
wanton act. Whether an act is willful or wanton 
is greatly dependent upon the particular circum-
stances of each case. Where the omission to 
exercise care is so gross that it shows a lack of 
regard for the safety of others, it will justify 
the presumption of willfulness or wantonness.' '' 
Again at page 402 : 
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"In the instant case, the evidence shows that 
the plaintiff and defendant were sleepy and tired. 
Defendant admits that to be true as does the 
plaintiff. The attendant at the gasoline station 
also testified that the t\YO men appeared to be 
very tired and sleepy and he \Yarned then1 to be 
careful. Defendant knevv that he was sleepy and 
\Yas apt to fall asleep \Yhile driving, yet he took 
control of the automobile and drove until he 
actually fell asleep which resulte-d in the accident 
whereby plaintiff was injured. 
''In Barmann v. McConachie, 289 TIL App. 
196, at page 202, 6 N. E. 918, 921, the court con-
tinuing in its opinion said: 
,.Defendant seriously contends that defend-
ant's failure to judge correctly of his ability to 
resist sleep was an error of judgment and that 
it will not support a finding of willful and wanton 
negligence. D·efendant's act did not arise from 
an error of judgment. It came about by reason 
of his failure to exercise judgment. He permitted 
himself to go to sleep while driving, and an act 
of omission may be made the basis of willful and 
wanton negligence, the same as an act of com-
miSSion. 
'The finding of the jury that the defendant 
was guilty of willful and wanton negligence is 
supported by the law and evidence.~ '' 
In the case of Barmann vs. McConachie, 6 N. E. 2d 
918 (lll. 1937), plaintiff sued for personal injuries al-
legedly the result of defendant's willful and wanton 
negligence in the operation of his automobile at a time 
when plaintiff was riding with him as his guest The 
evidence showed that the defendant driver, when two 
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or three miles from his destination, knew the guest was 
asleep, appreciated that an accident might happen if he 
also w·ent to sleep and that he was sle~epy. He continued 
to drive, however, and the automobile crashed into a 
telephone pole. Judgment for the plaintiff was af-
firmed upon appeal. 
See also Secrist v. Raffleson, 62 N. E. 2d 36 (Ill. 
1945). 
In Potz vs. Williams, 155 Atl. 211 (Conn. 1931) de-
fendant driver was proceeding at a moderate rate of 
speed on the proper side of a rather wide street when 
his car suddenly swerved across the street and collided 
with an oncoming car. He had been driving .all day 
before the accident, was tired and yawning, and had 
apparently momentarily dozed a short time before the 
actual collision. Judgment for guest plaintiff was af-
firmed. The applicable law was stated by the court at· 
page 212 as follows:· 
''As a guest in the car the plaintiff could only 
recover if she satisfied the jury that the defend-
ant was guilty of reckless conduct within the 
provisions of section 1628 of the General Stat-
utes. This statute, in the aspect of it here pre-
sented, requires proof by a guest in an automo-
bile seeking to recover from the operator of it 
that the accident was '' 'caused by his heedless 
and his reckless disregard of the rights of 
others,' and, in substance, that it constituted 
wanton misconduct which consisted of a reckless 
disregard of the just rights or safety of others 
in their lives, limbs, health, reputation, or prop-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
erty, or of the consequences of one's action.'' 
Grant v. :JiacLelland, 109 Conn. 517, 5~0, 147 A. 
138, 139. In Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 
page 592, 131 _._-\. 43:2, 435, 44 A. L. R. 785, in 
considering sleep in its relation to negligence, we 
said: ''In anv ordinarY case, one cannot go to 
sleep \vhile driving an. ~utomobile \Yithout haYing 
relaxed the vigilance \Yhich the la\v requires, 
\Yithout having been negligent. It lies vvithin his 
own control to keep a"rake or cease from driving. 
And so the mere fact of his going to sleep while 
driving is a proper basis for an inference of 
negligence sufficient to make out a prima facie 
case, and sufficient for a recovery, if no circum-
stances tending to excuse or justify his conduct 
are proven." \\T e also there pointed out (page 
591 of 103 Conn., 131 A. 432, 435) : ''There are 
fe\v ordinary agencies so fraught with danger 
to life and property as an automobile proceeding 
upon the highway freed from the direction of a 
conscious mind, and, because this is so, reasonable 
care to avoid such a danger requires very great 
care." It is but the plainest common sense· fo 
recognize that there are circumstances under 
which the operation of an automobile upon the 
highway by one who is or should be aware of the 
likelihood that sleep will overtake him could 
reasonably be held to constitute reckless mis-
conduct. Blood v. Adams (Mass.) 169 N. E. 412. 
Whether in a particular case this is so must de-
pend upon the circumstances, and especially upon 
the extent to which the driver realizes or ought 
to realize that there is a likelihood of sleep over-
taking him. Ordinarily the decision of the ques-
tion must be one of fact for the jury, and, if the 
conclusion they reach is reasonable in the light 
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of the evidence and the inferences they may prop-
erly draw, it must stand." 
In Erickson v. V o gt, 80 P. 2d 533 (Calif. 1938) the 
plaintiff guest and defendant driver were returning to 
San Diego somewhat after midnight, when the driver 
dozed to such an extent that the automobile grazed the 
curh. Sometime later he dozed again and the car struck 
a pole, injuring plain tiff. The case was predicated upon 
willful misconduct and intoxication, as to which later 
element there was.also some ·evidence. Judgment on an 
instructed verdict for defendant was revers·ed, the court 
holding that it was a jury question on the issues. 
The court stated at page 535: 
''As was again said in Wright v. Sellers, 79 
P. 2d 209, page 215, with respect to the matter of 
proof: 
'It is sufficient if the act, or the failure to 
act, be done or omitted under such circumstances 
as would justify the reasonable inference that the 
driver should have known that injury to his guest 
vvas a probable result, for again, positive eviden-
tiary proof of such knowledge would be an im-
p·ossibility in most cases.' 
In the circumstances we think that the ques-
tion whether respondent was or was not guilty 
of willful misconduct was in the instant case one 
of fact for the jury, rather than. of la-\v for the 
court.'' 
In Hardgrove v:s. Bade, 252 N. W. 334 (Minn. 1934) 
plaintiff guest and defendant driver were on a trip from 
Minneapolis to Bismarck, N. D. Whil·e on a detour, de-
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fendant fell asleep and plunged the automobile into a 
ditch injuring the plaintiff. Three times during the trip 
the plaintiff had requested the defendant to let her 
drive if tired and sleepy, but defendant assured her 
he 'vas all right and ·needed no assistance. Defendant 
had stated he was tired and sleepy several times prior 
to the accident. At the time the car left the highway, 
the plaintiff had closed her eyes, but was not certain 
whether she was actually asleep or not. The court ap·-
plied the law of North Dakota and its guest statute 
granting a cause of action for intoxication, willful mis-
conduct or gross negligence and held the cas'e presented 
a jury question as to defendant's liability. Judgment 
for plaintiff was affirmed. 
In Masters vs. Cardi, 42 S. E. 2d 203 (Va. 1947), 
the court stated at page 206: 
''Gross negligence has been defined in many 
of our opinions and we need not define it again. 
Each case must depend upon its own peculiar 
facts, and we generally leave the determination 
of the question to the jury. It is their province 
to consider all of the evidence including the cir-
cumstances and surroundings of each case and 
then ascertain whether the acts and conduct of 
the host amount to gross negligence.'' 
See also Curtis vs. ~Curtis, 70 P. 2d 369 (Ida. 1937); 
Salvas vs. Cantin, 160 Atl. 727 (N. H. 1932) ; ~CorV'alho 
v·s. Oliveria, 25 N. E. 2d 764 (Mass. 1940); Tennes v·s. 
Tennes, 50 N. E. 2d 132 (Ill. 1943); Hoffa·rt vs. Southern 
Pacific Co., 92 P. 2d 436 (Cal. 1939); McMillan vs. Sims, 
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112 S. W. 2d 793 (Tex. 1939); Manse.r VB. Eder, 248 N. 
W. 563 (Mich. 1933); Freedman vs. Hurwitz, 164 Atl. 
64 7 (Conn. 1933). 
Appellant is fully cognizant of the fact that a few 
of the above citations deal with an issue of gross negli-
gence as contrasted to willful misconduct. The citations 
have be'en incorporated herein, however, because the 
definitions of gross negligence seem to ·embody the main 
essentials of willful misconduct as defined in cases from 
jurisdictions whose statute is of the latter type. For 
exampl'e in Smith vs. Williams, 178 P. 2d 710 (Ore. 
1947), the court stated at page 717: 
''We hold that evidence that respondent drove 
a bantam automobile over a road which was sur-
faced with loose rock and gravel at a speed up-
ward of 50 miles per hour at 4 :00 in the morning 
while he was sleepy and notwithstanding this 
knowledge continued to drive and did go to sleep 
thereby permitting the car to leave the road a.nd 
turn over, is sufficient to take this case to the 
jury on the issue of gross negligence. We hold 
this constitutes evidence of conduct which indi-
cates an indifference to the probable conse-
quences of the act, a reckless disregard of the 
rig·ht of others." 
In addition, these cases on gross negligence clearly 
point to the considerations involved ·in determining 
whether or not there is a jury question in a given set 
of facts involving dozing at the wheel of an automobile. 
What is the net result of the application of the 
rules of 1aw set forth above to the facts of the instant 
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rase'? .. A.. driver ·with fore,Yarning of sleep, even in-
cluding an incident 'Yhere the van he was operating 
left the highway as a result of dozing, later does go to 
sleep and his van leaves the highway, turns over and 
damages plaintiff. As the cases point out, sleep does 
not come about instantly, and an experienced driver 
who finds his faculties impaired and who must know 
that to sleep at the wheel not only might but probably 
will produce serious results, but notwithstanding con-
tinues the operation of the car, would certainly seem 
to be guilty of willful misconduct. The extent of fore-
warning may not always be possible of accurate deter-
mination, but there is certainly in this case overwhelm-
ing evidence of such a forewarning. F·or a court to take 
the position as a matter of law th'at willful misconduct 
could not he adduced from the evidence of this case by 
the jury is difficult to understand. In fact, the evi-
dence seems so uncontroverted in this regard, that it 
might be said that the willful misconduct was estab-
lished as a matter of law. 
B. Contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 
Both contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk are asserted in the motions for directed verdicts. 
The distinction between the two seems clearly estab-
lished in Utah, whatever 'the rule elsewhere, even though 
reliance is made on th,e same set of facts. 
In Kuchenmeister V'S. Los Angeles and 8. L. R. Co., 
52 Utah 116, 172 Pac. 725 ( 1918), the court stated, pages 
728, 729: 
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'' * * * The defenses of assumed risk and 
contributory negligence are entirely independent, 
and in case there is a conflict in the evidence, or 
where the facts are such that reasonable men 
may legitimately draw different conclusions from 
the evidence, or may arrive at different conclu-
sions, it cannot be determined as a matter of law 
that either the one or the other defense is estab~ 
lished, and the jury may, therefore, find that one 
of the defenses was established and may also find 
that the other was not. While in some of. the 
cases there is some confusion respecting the dis-
tinction between the two defenses, yet, as a gen-
·eral rule, the courts have found little difficulty 
in enforcing the true distinction. The distinction 
is, perhaps, as well and as clearly stated in a few 
words as that can be done in the case of Thomas 
v. Quartermaine, in L. R. 18, Q. B. Div. at page 
697, where, in discussing the distinction, it is 
said: 
'But the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria 
(assumed risk) stands outside the defense of 
contributory negligence and is in no way limited 
by it. In individual instances the two ideas 
sometimes seem to cover the same ground, but 
carelessness is not the sante thing as intelligent 
choice.' (Italics ours.) 
"The distinction is also very intelligently dis-
cussed and clearly stated by the author in 3 
Labatt Mast. & Serv. Sec. 1219 et seq. The fun-
damental element in -assumption of risk, where 
it is not assumed as a matter of contract, as stated 
in the foregoing quotation, is 'intelligent choice'; 
that is, the employe, before he may he charged 
with having assumed the risk, must not only have 
fully understood and appreci~ted the danger, but 
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he, in the very face of the danger, must, volun-
tarily, have assumed the risk of injury. Nothing 
short of that constitutes intelligent choice. As a 
matter of course, whether in any case the risk 
,,·as or \Yas not assumed must be determined from 
all the facts and circumstances. But whatever 
those facts and circumstances are, it must appear 
therefrom that the employe voluntarily elected 
to continue in the hazardous work. It needs no 
argument, therefore, to demonstrate that while 
·in a particular case facts may be such as to jus-
tify a finding of both contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk, yet contributory negligence 
does not necessarily arise from intelligent choice, 
and therefore is not necessarily included in 
assumption of risk, as contended for by counsel. 
''In view of what has just been said, it was 
the province of the jury to say which one of the 
two defenses was established.'' 
Contributory negligence is not a defense to action-
able conduct involving \Yillfulness or wantonness, and 
since this case does involve willful misconduct, it is dif-
ficult to see how such a defense in the usual sense of the 
term can be asserted. Thus in Bordonaro vs. Senk, 147 
Atl. 136 (Conn. 1929) the court stated, page 137 : 
"Error is predicated upon the charge that 
contributory negligence upon the plaintiff's part 
would constitute no defense to an action based 
upon the defendant's reckless disregard of the 
rights of oth~rs. The defense of contributory 
negligence is not available where injury is in-
flicted under· conditions open to the charge of 
willfulness or wantonness.'' 
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The rule seems so well established as not to require 
extensive citation. See Moreno vs. Los Angeles Trans-
fer, 186· Pac. 800 (Calif. 1919) ; annotation: ''What 
amounts to gross or wanton negligence in driving an 
automobile precluding the defense of contributory neg-
ligence. '' 38 A. L. R. 1424 ; s. 72 A. L. R. 1357 ; s. 92 
A. L. R. 1367 ; s. 119 A. L. R. 654. 
It may be, however, that an act or failure to act 
on the part of the defendant amounting in itself to will-
ful misconduct, could become a defense, which for want 
of a more accurate term could be called contributory 
negligence. The importance lies in the fact that if such 
a defense is available, the degree of culpability must be 
equal. The cases cited above set forth the rules of law 
to he -applied in determining willful misconduct and in 
a broad sense would be equally applicable to any alleged 
conduct of the plaintiff. 
Assumption of risk and what might be termed con-
tributory willful misconduct -have certain elements in 
common, even though they may present distinct theories 
of possible defense. Assumption of risk seems to have 
originated in the contractual relationship of master and 
servant, and is. still in many jurisdictions unavailable 
as a theory of defense to .a tort action. In, those juris-
dictions wherein the theory is permitted as a defense, 
however, the basic assumption is that the plaintiff is 
fully and completely aware of all of the haz!ards which 
confront him, and notwithst~anding that knowledge elects 
to continue his conduct or acquiesence in the actions of 
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another. Before he can assumt> the risk, he n1ust first 
fully know· and appreciate what that risk entails. Con-
tributory "illful misconduct, if such there be, also re-
quires that a complete and thorough knowledge of the 
hazards confronting the plaintiff he known and fully 
understood. The theory could only he, thereafter, that 
not\vithstanding that knowledge and appreciation he 
then fails to take the action indicated or continues a 
course of action so clearly against his own interest as 
to amount to willful misconduct. 
In the instant case the action of the trial court in 
granting a directed verdict means that as a matter of 
la\v plaintiff fully appreciated the dangers confronting 
him, assuming this was the ground upon which the 
court's action \Yas predicated. As has been previously 
indicated, sleep is a peculiar thing, and somewhat dif-
ferent from other physical conditions such as intoxica-
tion. The knowledge of the extent to which the condi-
tion affects the physical abilities is peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the individual affected. True there may 
be external indications, but there is always a serious 
question ~as to just what they indicate. In this case, the 
driver stated a number of times that he was tired and 
sleepy, and he even on one oc.casion left the road mo-
mentarily before the accident. But how wa·s the plaintiff 
to know that any such real danger continued to exist~ 
He was confronted by a man who was a professional 
driver, engaged in van movements on a cross country 
basis, and obviously experienced. The driver might 
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well have been tired and sleepy, but in view of the cir-
cumstances how can it be .said as a matter of law that 
he was so tired and sleepy, that plaintiff fully appre-
ciated the dangers confronting him~ The driver was 
unknown to the plaintiff prior to the time he entered 
the van, and there is nothing whatsoever to indicate 
that he knew .anything of the mode of operation of the 
van line, or of· the previous driving time of the driver. 
That there actually was a danger, and real one, is ap, 
parent from the fact that the driver went to sleep and 
turned over the van. Only one man knew with certainty 
the extent of the danger, and that was the driver him-
self. Can it be said as a matter of law, that the defendant 
fully appreciated the hazards~ 
The contributory feature goes further, however, 
since there must not only be the complete appreciation 
of the danger, but also a failure to act. This leads to 
the interesting inquiry of just what the plaintiff could 
do ~as a practical matter. There is, incidently, nothing 
in the record to show whether or not the plaintiff could 
drive a car at all. Assume that he could, it is entirely 
possible that the ordinary man would assume that a 
request to drive a commercial van of large size would 
he denied, and· there is also the question as to whether 
or not an inexperienced individual would be capable of 
driving such a vehicle. Was he as a matter of law re-
quired to keep up a running flow of conversation, under 
the circumstances~ As a matter of law was i~t necessary 
to step ·out of a van in the middle of the night in country 
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which the plaintiff believed, and which could accurately 
be described as, wilderness 1 Or to alight a't Wend over 
or Wells again in the middle of the night1 In actuality, 
was there anything to be gained by staying awake 1 In 
this latter connection, the evidence is far from clear as 
to ,,~hether or not plaintiff "\vas asleep or awake during 
the period just prior to the accident, and for that 
matter as to just how much of the trip he was asleep. 
It seems clear that these are matters within the 
province of the jury to decide, and it is difficult ·to see 
how a trial court could resolve the problem as a. matter 
of law. The cases clearly indicate that a jury question 
is presented. 
Thus in Freedman vs. Hurwitz, 164 Atlantic 647 
(Conn. 1933), the court considered at length the doc-
trine of assumption of risk. The plaintiffs, age 15 and. 
60, were riding as guests in the rear seat of defendant's 
automobile. TheY: had joined defendant after he had 
done considerable driving and was tired, and prior to 
the accident and while driving, defendant and his wife 
in the front seat of the automobile had stated that he 
was tired and was afraid he might go to sleep and 
that if he did, his wife "\vas to tickle him or pinch him. 
The automobile swerved suddenly to the left side of 
the highway and into an oncoming car some distance 
after this conversation had taken place. The court held 
that jury might have reasonably inferred that the cause 
of the accident was due to the defendant's falling asleep 
as he came opposite the other car. The defendant had 
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interposed a special plea of assumption of risk in each 
of the actions brought by the two plaintiffs. Judgment 
for pl,aintiff in each case was affirmed. The defendant 
on appeal contended the verdict should have been set 
aside because the jury could not reach any conclusion 
other than that the risk had been assumed and also 
because, at the trial, the court had refused to submit 
to the jury this defense. In discussing the doctrine, the 
court stated ~at page ~649 : 
''One is entitled to assume that another will 
exercise proper care until he perceives, or ought 
reasonably to perceive, that that other is not 
doing so, and he does not assume the risk that 
another will by some sudden negligent act or 
omission subject him to danger. Stout v. Lewis, 
11 La. App. 503, 123 So. 346. A pedestrian cross-
ing a highway and injured by the negligent 
operation of an automobile upon it, or the driver 
of one car injured by collision with another, 1nay 
be guilty of contributory negligence, but he does 
not assume the risk of the sudden negligent act 
or omission of the party who caused the collision. 
1 Pollock, Torts, 173. So the mere fact that there 
is a possibility known to the guest in an automo-
bile that the driver may be guilty of a negligent 
act or omission may not he a sufficient basis 
upon which to hold that he has assumed the risk. 
Marks v. Dorkin, supra, page 524 of 105 Conn., 
136 A. 83. And the doctrine can only apply where 
the particular situation or condition producing 
the risk has continued for such a length of time 
that the party alleged to have assumed it can be 
found to have known it or been charged with 
knowledge of it, to have appreciated the risk to 
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which he was subjected by it, either actually or 
because he ought reasonably to have done so, and 
to have had an opportunity to avoid it. 
''It remains to apply these principles to the 
case before us. The plaintiffs are a young girl 
about fifteen years old at the time of the accident 
and a woman then about sixty. They were riding 
as guests of the defendant in the rear seat of his 
automobile. It is true that the jury could have 
reasonably found that each knew that the defend-
ant was tired and sleepy and that he realized he 
might fall asleep while driving the car, yet there-
after, without remonstrance or effort to guard 
themselves from danger, they continued to ride 
in it for a few minutes-just how long the record 
does not disclose. As far as the denial of the 
motion to set the verdict aside is concerned, it 
must be remembered that the defense of assump-
tion of risk is an affirmative one with the burden 
of proof upon the defendant, and we cannot say 
that the jury were bound to find as matter of law 
that the plaintiffs appreciated the risk of the 
defendant falling asleep. But beyond that, con-
sidering the ages and sex of these plaintiffs, their 
position as guest of the defendant riding upon 
the rear seat of the car, the hour of the night, 
and the place where they were, with the other 
surrounding circumstances, it does not appear 
that there was any course which it could reason-
ably be said they ought to have adopted to avoid 
such danger as there was in the situation. The 
jury could n·ot reasonably have found that by con-
tinuing in the car they voluntarily chose to assume 
the risk within the true meaning of the doctrine. 
The trial court was correct in not submitting to 
the jury the issue raised by the special pleas.'' 
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And in Erickson V'S. Vogt, supra, the court stated at 
page 536: 
"What we have here is a verdict for the de-
fendant brought in under the courts instructions. 
Upon an appeal from such a verdict appellant is 
entitled to have every legitimate inference dra\vn 
in her favor. While it is true that in the instant 
case the parties had both ·been drinking during 
the time they were at the dance hall, and had the 
case been submitted to the jury it might have 
found respondent to have been so far intoxicated 
as to affect the safety of his driving, either by 
making him drowsy ·or otherwise, still the evidence 
does not indicate that his appearance was such as 
necessarily to warn appellant o.f hi.s inability to 
drive. So far as appears she may have had no 
reasons for real apprehension, at least until he 
fell into the doze and grazed the curb, and may 
not, ev·en then, be chargeable with fully realizing 
her danger or being in any position to have av'Oid-
ed it." 
The court also quotes from the case of Lindemann 
v. Sa;n Joaquin Cotton Oil Compa;ny, a,t page 536, as 
follows: 
"'There is no merit in the suggestion or eon-
tention that the evidence which tended to estab;. 
lish the intoxication of defendant Ewing to the 
degree \vhich would render him liable for the 
injuries and damages suffered by reason of the 
accident is necessarily conclusive of the question 
as to whether plaintiff had, or should have had, 
knowledge that Ewing was so far affected by 
intoxicating liquor as to defeat his claim for 
damages. If that is trwe, then .every person riding 
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single fact that the driver was not in a fit condi-
tion to drive the automobile . . . ' '' 
And in Smith vs. Williams, supra, the court stated 
at page 718: 
''We hold that it is ~ question of fact as to 
whether or not appellant was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence by reason of the fact. that he was 
asleep at the time of the accident. Even if the 
jury should find that this constituted negligence 
upon the part of the appellant, still it is a· ques-
tion of fact as to whether or not that negligence 
proximately contributed to the happening of the 
accident. 38 Am. Jur. 898, and cases cited in 
notes 4 and 5. The question would still he : C·ould 
he have done anything if awake~" 
While the defendants pleaded the defense of as-
sumption of risk the answer is silent ·as to any defense 
of what might loosely be called contributory negligence. 
Both are affirmative defenses, and assumption of risk 
must be pleaded. See Slobodnjak vs. Coyne, 165 Atl. ·681 
(Conn. 1933); Maurer vs. Fesing, 290 N. W. 191 
(Wis. 1940). Because of the similarity between the 
defenses, it seems entirely logical to assume that the 
defense of willful misconduct must also he pleaded, 
and that if it is not, no assertion of the defense can be 
made. In this connection it is noted that willful mis-
conduct is an entirely distinct matter from the ordinary 
defense of contributory negligence. 
Lastly, defendant Overland Moving Compnny as-
sertS' that it cannot be held liable for the actions of its 
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driver because h.e was specifically instructed not to pick 
up riders, and his action in taking the plaintiff into the 
truck as a p.as~senger and guest was in direct violation 
of those instructions. This may well be true as to a 
guest in an action predicated upon ordinary negligence. 
In a case, however, involving willful misconduct, the 
converse is true, an·d the defendant employer is liable. 
An annotation, ''Liability of master for injury to 
one whom servant, in violation of instructions, permits 
to ride on vehicle," 12 A.L.R. 145, it is ·stated at page 
147: 
''On the other hand, one riding on a vehicle 
by the permission of a servant, in violation of his 
master's instructions, is not, according to the 
weight of authority, deprived of all recourse 
against the master f.or an injury sustained, 
though the servant, in granting the permission, 
is not acting within the scope of his employment, 
or is not clothed by the master with the appan·nt 
authority to grant it. In the case of such an 
authorized permission to a third person to be on 
the vehicle, it is generally held that, although~ 
the master is not required to exercise the same 
degree of care as "\vhere the per1nission is auth-
orized actually or ostensibly, he is nevertheless 
liable for a wanton, wilful, or reckless injury 
inflicted on the third person by a servant who is 
acting within the scope of his employment.'' 
In conclusion, it is submitted that there was more 
than adequate evidence to submit the issue of the de-
fendants' willful misconduct, and their liability, to the 
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jury, and that the action of the trial court in directing 
a verdict in favor of each of the defendants was clearly 
error. 
Respectfully ~submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Dated July 26, 1948. 
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